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WATSON AND SUBJECTIVE HIRING PRACTICES: THE
CONTINUING SAGA OF INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
TITLE VII AND PERSONNEL SELECTION
INTRODUCTION
The field of employment discrimination law presents an incredible array of
practical problems for human resource practitioners.I The cornerstone of the federal
effort to curtail employment discrimination, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII),1 has focused the attention of human resource professionals and academicians
on certain employment selection and promotion practices. 3 Specifically, one scien-
tific discipline, industrial psychology, 4 has a long history of association with Title
V1. 5
Based on this continuing relationship, each Supreme Court decision concern-
ing the use of employment selection devices or systems6 inevitably affects the study
' The massive body of federal (e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal Pay Act, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Employee Retirement Income Secutiry Act) and state fair
employment laws have created a need for diversified human resource professionals well educated in the law
to avoid costly litigation.
2 Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000a - 2000e17 (1982).
1 Prior articles have hypothesized on Title VII analysis of subjective selection devices, See, Note, Defining
the Proper Bounds of Disparate Impact Analysis: Beyond an ObjectivelSubjective Employment Criteria
Dichotomy, 49 U. Prr. L. REV. 657-83 (1988); Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does the
Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63-93 (1988); Rigler, Title VII and the
Applicability ofDisparate Impact Analysis to Subjective Selection Criteria, 88W. VA. L. REV. 25-46(1988);
Comment, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under Title VII, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 957-
79 (1987); Comment, Application of the Adverse Impact Analysis to Subjective Criteria In Title VII
Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 363-83 (1986); Comment, Evaluation of Subjective
Selection Systems in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases: -A Misuse of Disparate Impact Analysis,
7 CARDOZO L. REV. 549-83 (1986) and statistical analysis of discrimination claims. See, e.g., Laycock, Sta-
tistical Proof and Theories of Discrimination, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97-106 (1986).
' Industrial psychology is the study of man and his workplace. See infra note 109.
-'The Division of Industrial/Organizational Psychology (Division 14) of the American Psychological Asso-
ciation ("APA") was an active participant in the development of the Uniform Federal Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1-1607.18 (1978) (hereinafter Guidelines), was the
benefactor of an express statutory exemption for "professionally developed" tests in Title VII, § 703(h), and
is the subject of comment in numerous Title VII opinions. E.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405,429 (1975) ("Albermarle engaged an expert in industrial psychology to 'validate' the job relatedness
of its testing program.") The industrial psychologist is commonly involved in pre-trial, trial, and post-trial
activity in employment discrimination litigation. See B. SCHLE! & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 158-59 (2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN).
Section 703(h) provides, in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test ...."
6 The term "selection device" connotes a single procedure (e.g., test) used in personnel selection; a
"selection system" connotes greater than one device, in combination (e.g., a test score and an interview),
used for selection purposes.
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and practice of industrial psychology. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,7 the
Supreme Court's most recent Title VII decision, is an ideal example. Watson
afforded industrial psychologists the opportunity to provide important information
which will impact future human resource management. 8 Employers, with the aid of
industrial psychology, must now re-evaluate their subjective selection practices. A
legally defensible subjective practice, like an objective practice, must select indi-
viduals based on job-related factors and not rely on employer intuition.
This comment will analyze Watson from both a legal and industrial psycho-
logical perspective. Part one of the comment discusses the legal impact of Watson.
First, the Supreme Court's analytical framework for Title VII discrimination claims
is presented.9 Next, Watson is analyzed in the context of prior case law to consider
its potential impact on employment discrimination litigation. 10
Part two concentrates on the role of industrial psychology in the Watson
decision. First, the comment introduces industrial psychology.1' The association of
industrial psychology, Title VII, and personnel selection is presented next.1 2 Finally,
the comment presents current industrial psychological research concerning several
"subjective" selection devices.'3
PART 1
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 14
Title VII, Section 703(a)(1),15 makes it an "unlawful employment practice for
an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual" because of that individual's "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." In addition, an employer may not "limit,
segregate, or classify" employees or applicants "in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of" those same characteristics. 16
108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
The APA filed an amicus curiae brief, which embodied the ideology of industrial psychology. That brief
provided the Supreme Court with insight into the possible use and defense of subjective selection deviced
in Title VII litigation. See, Brief for the American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, reprinted in 143 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1019-28 (1988) (hereinafter APA Brief).
'See infra note 14 - 56.
0 See infra notes 74 - 108.
" See infra notes 109 - 110.
2 See infra notes 111-120.
3 See infra notes 121 - 161.
14 See supra note 2.
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2.
16 Id. Section 703(c)(2) imposes parallel obligations on labor organizations.
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The Supreme Court's interpretation of these provisions has resulted in a series of
Title VII decisions which regulate employment selection practices.
The Supreme Court's Development of Title VII Theory
In an effort to achieve equal employment opportunity, Title VII seeks to
abolish employment barriers which operate to favor one class of persons over
another. 17 To accomplish that goal, the Supreme Court has articulated two theories
of discrimination. Currently, Title VII violations may be proved under: (1) disparate
impact theory'8 and/or (2) disparate treatment theory. 19
1. The Disparate Impact Theory
Disparate impact made its debut in the seminal case, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 20 In Griggs, the employer's selection procedure for initial hiring and promotion
decisions required a satisfactory score on two standardized aptitude tests. 21 The
court of appeals, which focused on the absence of a discriminatory motive for the test
use, dismissed the case. 22
The Supreme Court reversed. 23 The Court expressly rebutted the court of
appeals' analysis.24  The Griggs Court held that "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mecha-
nisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability.' '25 The Court concluded that "Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation.' '26
Griggs established the principle that "facially neutral" selection practices
that have significant adverse effects (e.g., significantly lower scores) on protected
groups are a violation of Title VII. 27 Thus, a violation is established regardless of
the absence of discriminatory motive.28
7 See, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-31 (1971).
8 See infra notes 20 - 32. The disparate impact theory is hereinafter referred to as the impact theory.
'9 See infra notes 33 - 41. The disparate treatment theory is hereinafter referred to as the treatment theory.
20 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
21 See L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 27 (4th ed. 1984) (hereinafter L. Cronbach) ("A
test is considered to be standardized when the tester's words and acts, the apparatus, and the scoring have been
fixed so that the scores collected at different times and places are fully comparable.")
22 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
23 See supra note 20.
24 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432-34.
I d. at 432 (emphasis added).
I ld. (emphasis in original).
27The Griggs Court stated: "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.28I d.
Spring, 1989] COMMENTS
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AKRON LAW REVIEW
a) the evidentiary framework
The Court's interest in the selection device's effects focused its analysis on a
device's operational results. Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case consists of proving
that the employer's selection device has a disproportionate effect (i.e., adverse
impact) on a protected group.29 If the plaintiff satisfies its burden of persuasion, the
"...employer can escape liability only if it persuades the court that the selection
process producing the disparity has a 'manifest relationship to the employment in
question'." 3 To do so, an employer will often show that the selection device
"bear[s] a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the job for which
it was used." ' 31 This relationship, in effect, establishes that the selection device
measures the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA's) necessary for successful job
performance. Therefore, the selection device is a legitimate, non-discriminatory
basis for employment selection.
If the employer sustains its burden of persuasion on the "business necessity"
(i.e., job relatedness) issue, the plaintiff may introduce evidence showing the
availability of a less discriminatory procedure which equally advances the em-
ployer's asserted interest.32
2. The Disparate Treatment Theory
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green33 introduced the Supreme Court's dispa-
29 Adverse impact is a legal concept that is used to establish the relative effects of a selection device on separate
groups of applicants (e.g., white vs. black, male vs. female). Adverse impact is defined as: "A selection rate
for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (eighty percent) of the rate for the group
with the highest rate .... " Guidelines, supra notes, at 1607.4(D).
A selection rate is the ratio of hirees to applicants within a specified group (i.e., 5 minority hirees/
5 minority applicants = selection rate of 1). For example, Company A requires a high school diploma for the
position of cashier. The applicant pool consists of 50 males and 50 females. Company A hires 8 males and
2 females. The selection rate of males and females is .16 (16%) and .04(4%), respectively. The diploma
requirement adversely impacts females because .04 (female selection rate)/. 16 (male selection rate) = .25
(25%). Because 25% is less than 80%, the diploma requirement fails the four-fifths test.30 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,446 (1982)
(quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432) (emphasis added)). Thus, the burden of persuasion also shifts to the
defendant, not merely the burden of production.
3' Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. This procedure is commonly known as "validation." See infra notes 124 - 125.
Validation is defined as "the effort through which the appropriateness and meaningfulness of interpretations
from scores on a measure can be estimated." See Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Inc.,
Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures 41 (3rd ed. 1987) (hereinafter
Principles).32 The business necessity defense is conceptualized as two separate elements: (1) aprimafacie demonstration
of "business necessity" is established by the defendant proving that a "manifest relationship" (see supra
note 31 and accompanying text) exists between the challenged selection device and a bona fide business
prupose (i.e., the test selects the person best able to perform the job); (2) if "business necessity" is
established, the plaintiff is entitled to demonstrate that alternative devices are available to serve the
employer's proffered business purpose. The alternative presented must have less adverse impact on the
protected class. See PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.41 (West 1988) (hereinafter PLAYER).
33 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
[Vol. 22:4
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rate treatment analysis. In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, a black ex-employee,
alleged that the defendant's decision not to re-hire him was based on race. 4 The
Court dismissed the action and, in doing so, promulgated the current evidentiary
scheme used in treatment cases.35
a) the evidentiary framework
In contrast to the disparate impact theory, the treatment analysis concentrates
on the defendant's alleged discriminatory motive or intent.36 The Court developed
a series of shifting burdens which focus judicial inquiry solely on the issue of illegal
motive. Under this scheme, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of production. 37 In
order to satisfy that burden, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he/she belongs to a
protected group; (2) he/she applied and was qualified for the job which was vacant;
(3) despite satisfactory qualifications, he/she was rejected; and (4) after the rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from
persons with similar qualifications. 38
If the plaintiff establishes a prima-facie case, the burden shifts to the defen-
dant39 to "articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory" rationale for its selection
decision.40 If the defendant demonstrates such a rationale, the burden of production
shifts back to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who has carried the burden of persuasion
on the issue of discriminatory motive, must now establish that the employer's
proffered rationale is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination.
4
'
3. A Comparison of the Theories (Pre-Watson)42
Analytical focus and burden allocation are two key distinctions between the
impact and treatment theories.
The impact theory directs attention to the results of the employer's selection
l4 Id. at 794.
31 Id. at 802.
31 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2784.
"' McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
38 Id.
39lid. In contrast to an impact claim, the defendant's burden is one of production, not persuasion. "The prima
facie case is ... insufficient to shift the burden of proving a lack of discriminatory intent to the defendant."
Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2793 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This also provides insight as to why employers prefer
to litigate impact claims rather than treatment claims.
40 See, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
"' Id. at 256. Pretext evidence must be used to directly establish "that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Id. Evidence of pretext includes "direct evidence of a past or present prejudice toward the
plaintiff or members of plaintiff's class." See PLAYER, supra note 32, at § 5.40, p. 338. In addition, statistics
showing an unbalanced workforce and proof of inconsistent applications of the employer's proffered
rationale are probative of pretext. Id.
42 This section presents the state of the law prior to Watson. The plurality decision in Watson was split on
the issue of burden allocation under disparate impact claims. See infra note 48.
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device.43 In the absence of an adequate "business necessity" defense, the selection
device causing adverse impact is unlawful.' In sharp contrast, the employer's
discriminatory motive is the exclusive focus of the treatment theory.45
A more critical distinction, particularly for litigation purposes, is the alloca-
tion of burdens under each theory.46 Under the impact theory, the plaintiff bears the
initial burden of proof (i.e., production and persuasion).4 7 If that burden is met, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant. 48 Finally, if the defendant should satisfy that
burden, the plaintiff must prove that less discriminatory alternatives are available
which serve the same business purpose.
In contrast, the plaintiff does not, at any time, relinquish the burden of
persuasion in treatment cases. 49 After making out a case pursuant to the McDonnell
Douglas test, the burden of production shifts to the employer to explain the selection
decision in terms of non-discrimination.5 0 The burden of production then shifts back
to the plaintiff, combined with the burden of persuasion, and the pretext evidence is
presented .5 Thus, before Watson, there was no evidentiary confusion between the
theories. Each theory required a different degree of evidence on different elements
to establish a Title VII violation.
The Objective/Subjective Selection Device Crisis and Watson
Despite these distinctions, the analysis of certain selection devices caused
confusion in lower courts. Courts continually battled over whether an employer's
subjective (i.e., discretionary) selection device 52 was properly analyzed under: (1)
" Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1976) (impact claims question the validity of
"employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another.")
44See supra notes 27 - 28.
45 Teamsters, 411 U.S. at 335 n.15.
4 See supra note 42.
41 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2972 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
41 Id. (citations omitted). This issue was the focal point of dissension in Watson. Justice O'Connor's desire
to undertake a "fresh and somewhat closer examination" of the impact analysis met with unrest in the
remainder of the Court. Id. at 2788. The result was a 4 - 3 split. See infra note 75.
49 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2793 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
50 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
I ld. at 256.
52 A subjective selection device (e.g., interviews, performance ratings) is "used to refer variously to
procedures in which 'judgment or discretion [is exercised] on the part of the evaluator,' or which lack any
'neutral' factors.... Most simply, 'measures that require the statement of opinion, beliefs orjudgments....'"
See APA Brief, supra note 8, at 1020. In contrast, an objective measure (e.g., paper-and-pencil test) is one
which involves no personal evaluation. Performance on the device is measured relative to an objective source
(e.g., an answer key).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 22 [1989], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss4/5
treatment theory;53 (2) impact theory;54 or (3) both.55 Before the Watson decision was
handed down, both courts and commentators proposed solutions concerning the
analysis of such devices in Title VII litigation. The Watson Court articulated a clear
cut answer.
5 6
1. The Watson Decision
Petitioner, Clara Watson (Watson), a black employee at Fort Worth Bank &
Trust (Bank), was hired in 1973 as a proof operator.5 7 In early 1976, Watson received
a promotion to the drive-in facility teller position.58 After four years in that position,
Watson began to seek ajob change. 59 In the period 1980-81, Watson applied for four
supervisory positions and was denied each position.6°
The Bank's selection procedures were based on the unreviewed discretion of
bank supervisors.6I The Bank had failed to develop any formal devices (e.g., tests)
to select applicant's for the vacant supervisory positions. 62 Thus, each selection (i.e..
promotion) decision was made based on the subjective (i.e., personal) judgment of
supervisors who had knowledge of the candidates and the jobs to be filled. 63 This
placed the employment opportunities of each minority applicant in the hands of a
white supervisor with unbridled discretion. 64
13 See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633,639 (4th Cir. 1983) (impact analysis is only applicable
to objective devices) rev'd on other ground sub nom Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791,797 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1986) (subjective promotion procedure
does not fit impact model) cert. granted 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987), rev'd, Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust,
108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).54 See Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917,930 n. 19 (6th Cir. 1985) (subjective devices are
subject to Griggs analysis); Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1985) (subjective devices are
properly analyzed under impact theory); Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 767 F.2d 771, 776 (11 th Cir.
1985) (a selection process containing subjective devices is subject to impact analysis).
" See Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88, 93 (6th Cir. 1982) (subjective decision-making can
be analyzed under either theory).
56 Although a unanimous Court affirmatively answered the main issue concerning subjective devices, the
effect of that answer on the impact theory's analytical framework was far from unanimous. See supra note
48. Currently, it is unclear whether the plurality's position will become the majority view.
" Watson, 108 S. Ct. 2782.
58 Id.
59 Id.
Id. In February 1980, Watson applied for a position as supervisor of main lobby tellers. Id. She was rejected
in favor of a white male. Id. Subsequently, she applied for the drive-in bank supervisor position. Id. She
was rejected in favor of a white female. Id. Between 1980-81, Watson served as a commercial teller and,
informally, as assistant to the teller supervisor. Id. When the teller supervisor was promoted, Watson applied
for the vacant position. Id. She was rejected, again, in favor of the white female drive-in bank supervisor.
Id. Seizing the opportunity to fill that vacancy, Watson applied for the drive-in position. Id. Nonetheless,
she was rejected in favor of a white male. Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 Watson, 798 F.2d at 798 (5th Cir. 1986). All supervisors involved in promotion decisions concerning
Watson were white.
Spring, 1989] COMMENTS
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Watson filed an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC).65 Subsequent to this administrative process, Watson filed
suit in United States District Court (Northern District of Texas). 66 She alleged that
the Bank had unlawfully discriminated against blacks, as a group, in hiring, compen-
sation and several other employment procedures. 67 After a series of class action
motions, 68 the district court reviewed Watson's individual claims under the disparate
treatment theory. 69 The district court concluded that although a prima facie case was
established, the defendant satisfied its rebuttal burden, and, in the absence of the
plaintiff's showing of pretext, the action was dismissed. 70
The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part.7' The majority concluded
that the lower court's treatment analysis was sound.7" In addressing Watson's
argument that subjective selection procedures could be analyzed under the disparate
impact model, the court stated: "[A] Title VII challenge to an allegedly discrimina-
tory promotion system is properly analyzed under the disparate treatment model
rather than the disparate impact model." 73 This approach placed the subjective
selection crisis directly before the Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court decided that subjective devices were properly subject to
analysis under the impact theory. However, Justice O'Connor's attempt to re-cast
impact analysis in the form of treatment analysis, caused a faction in the Watson
decision. The Court's opinion hinged on two interrelated issues: (1) May subjective
selection devices, which adversely affect a protected class, be analyzed under the
disparate impact model? 74 and, if so, (2) What is the proper evidentiary framework
for analysis of those claims? 75
65 Watson, 108 S. Ct. 2782.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. Watson moved for class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. Although
the district court initially certified the class, the court later rescinded that certification. Id. The class was
bifurcated into: 1)black applicants; and 2) black employees. Id. at 2783. Subsequently, the employee sub-
class was found wanting under the numerousity requirements of Federal Rule 23(a) and decertified. Id. Then,
Watson was deemed as inadequate representative of the applicant sub-class based on incongruent claims. Id.
The district court did address the applicant class claims and ruled in the defendant's favor. Id.
69 Id. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See supra notes 33-41.
7 0 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 Id. This is consistent with prior case law in the fifth circuit. See, e.g, Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982) (subjective practices not akin to traditional bases for impact
analysis).
74 Id. at 2779. See infra note 78.
71 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and White, believed that the acceptance of
subjective devices for impact analysis necessitated a reformulation of the existing impact evidentiary
framework. Id. at 2788-91. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennen and Marshall, concurred in the
[Vol. 22:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Is Impact Analysis of Subjective Selection Procedures Proper?
A unanimous Court resolved this issue in the affirmative. The Court's
decision, authored by Justice O'Connor, turned on a basic proposition: the disparate
impact model is concerned solely with the disproportionate effects of a selection
device on a protected class.7 6 From this perspective the Court could not logically
distinguish subjective devices from objective devices (assuming identical adverse
effects on a protected class). A decision to exempt subjective devices from impact
analysis would have given employers an incentive to discard objective devices in
favor of subjective methods to avoid litigation of impact claims.77 In addition, the
Court believed that exemption of subjective devices would allow "employers so
easily to insulate themselves from liability under Griggs, disparate impact analysis
might effectively be abolished." 7 8
result but specifically denounced the plurality's attempted re-draft of impact analysis. Id. at 2791-97. Justice
Stevens, in yet another concurring opinion, took issue with Justice O'Connor's brash move and stated that
any discussion of a new framework was premature pending the outcome of the district court's analysis on
remand. Id. at 2797.76 Id. at 2785. (" [T]he necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices,
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to
intentional discrimination." (emphasis added)).
" This result undercuts the purpose of Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 attempted to focus employment
selection decisions on applicants' work related factors (e.g., knowledge, skills, and abilities), rather than
immutable factors such as race or sex. Thus, objective devices were favored over subjective devices because
the basis for employment decisions became more verifiable. If employers reverted back to subjective
decision-making, it could result in a corresponding shift in focus from job related to discriminatory factors.
This is an unacceptable result under Title VII. Accord, DovERSPIKE, BARRETr & ALEXANDER, The Feasibility
of Traditional Validation Procedures in Demonstrating Job Relatedness, 9 PSYCHOLOGY & LAW 35, 35 (1985)
(hereinafter DOVERSPIKE). ("The litigious climate has resulted in a decline in the use of tests and an increase
in more subjective methods of hiring.")
11 Id. at 2786. Although these conclusions are undoubtedly true, one of the Court's proffered rationale
underlying them is deceptive. The plurality concerned itself with employer attempts to avoid impact
analysis. The Court feared that if subjective devices were exempt from impact analysis, employers would
couch objective devices, with adverse impact, inside "subjective" selection systems. The Court stated that
a "selection system that combines both types [of devices] would generally have to be considered subjective
in nature." Id. The Court reasoned that under such a system, the employer could accord substantial deference
to the discriminatory objective devices and give little significance to the "token" subjective device (e.g.,
interview). This would allow employers to avoid impact analysis of discriminatory objective devices because
subjective systems would be subject only to treatment analysis. This proposition is misleading, particularly
as it concerns the Court's prior disparate impact decisions.
The real issue is why a selection device, within a "subjective" selection system, would not be subject
to impact analysis. In the "subjective" selection system below, the tests (i.e., objective devices) are
identifiable and subject to impact analysis in the same manner they would be without the interview (i.e.,
subjective device). It makes little practical sense to allow the mere presence of the interview to serve as an
impenetrable barrier in the face of a separate device's adverse impact. The author believes that such a position
is untenable in light of prior impact theory cases and the express purpose of Title VII.
Protection for employees/applicants, in the Court's hypothetical crisis, is embodied in the "business
necessity" defense. Under traditional impact analysis, the employer, after the employee's showing that the
selection practice has adverse impact, must establish that a "manifest relationship" exists between selection
device performance and job performance. Under Griggs, a selection device is to be adopted after a study
concerning its "relationship to job performance ability." In essence, an employer must, at a minimum, show
that their selection device(s) measure the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA's) needed for successful job
performance. If a certain KSA is used infrequently on the job (i.e., job performance is minimally dependent
Spring, 1989] COMMENTS
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The Court's Dissolution In The Face of A New Evidentiary Framework
After Watson, Title VII case law clearly dictates that selection devices (regard-
less of their objective or subjective nature), which have adverse impact, are subject
to disparate impact analysis. The blurry issue, particularly important to employment
lawyers and human resource professionals, is: In what evidentiary posture do the
on the KSA), the employer cannot legitimately give the device measuring the KSA a disproportionate weight
in the selection decision. In effect, the employer would emphasize the KSA in disproportion to its necessity
for job performance. This asymmetric relation is the antithesis of job relatedness which seeks to establish
the necessity of a selection device based on its relationship to job performance.
In addition, this "weighting" approach may subject an employer to plaintiff's showing of the
availability of a less discriminatory alternative.
For example, Company A has seven vacant secretarial positions. A job analysis reveals that typing
is 10%, dictation is 70%, and filing is 20% of the job. This can be interpreted to mean that a successful
secretary uses dictation skills seven times as often as an unsuccessful secretary. Based on the job analysis,
the employer adopts a selection system consisting of a typing test, dictation test, and a personal interview.
There are twenty applicants (10 blacks/10 white). The following are the scores of each applicant on
both tests:
BLACKS WHITES
TYPING(X .7) DICrATION(X .1) TOTAL TYPING(X .7) DICTATION(X .1) TOTAL
1. 2 1.4 5 .5 1.9 5 3.5 2 .2 3.7
2. 2 1.4 5 .5 1.9 5 3.5 2 .2 3.7
3. 2 1.4 5 .5 1.9 5 3.5 2 .2 3.7
4. 2 1.4 5 .5 1.9 5 3.5 2 .2 3.7
5. 2 1.4 5 .5 1.9 5 3.5 2 .2 3.7
6. 2 1.4 4 .4 1.8 5 3.5 2 .2 3.7
7. 2 1.4 3 .3 1.7 5 3.5 2 .2 3.7
8. 1 .7 3 .3 1.0 5 3.5 1 .1 3.6
9. 1 .7 4 .4 1.1 4 2.8 1 .1 2.9
10. 1 .7 4 .4 1.1 4 2.8 1 .1 2.9
Under the Supreme Court "worst case" scenario, the employer, who wants a white only workforce, weights
(i.e., assign a numerical value which expresses the importance of the KSA in the selection decision) the tests
in a manner that results in hiring only whites (the weight for typing = .7 and dictation = .1; see above).
Thus, an employer can easily manipulate test weights to accomplish a discriminatory objective. The
interview results are not considered in the actual decision-making process. The results of this "subjective"
selection process, including the "token" interview, suggest that seven whites, and no blacks, should be hired.
Consequently, a black plaintiff can attack the job relatedness (i.e., business necessity) of either test based on
the overall adverse impact of the selection system. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). The
employer must justify the use of these devices. The employer will assert that the devices are demonstrably
related to job performance (i.e., they are samples of what occurs on the job and, thus, the devices are valid
for this job (albeit only content valid, see infra note 125).
The plaintiff, in rebuttal, will attempt to show the availability of a less discriminatory use of the same system.
The plaintiff will show that if the tests are weighted in accordance with their importance to job performance
(as per the company's job analysis), the tests: (1) become increasingly job related, and (2) have less adverse
impact.
10
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plaintiff-employee and defendant-employer now find themselves?7 9
1. Justice O'Connor Forges a New Impact Analysis
The Watson Court reached an impasse on the issue of which party would bear
the burden of persuasion under an impact analysis. Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor,
penned a decision that could result in a major shift in Title VII litigation. 80
The practical ramifications of Watson stem from the type of proof commonly
used to establish impact claims. In the typical impact case, the plaintiff must show
that the selection device at issue had a disparate effect on a protected group.81 The
general focus of "evidence in these 'disparate impact' cases usually focuses on
statistical disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations
for those disparities." 82 In practice, this burden is easily met, and when satisfied
shifts the burden onto the employer to defend its use of the selection device. Justice
O'Connor assumed 83 that an employer will find it impractical, as well as scientifi-
cally questionable, to establish the "business necessity" (i.e., job relatedness) of
subjective selection devices. Consequently, she attempted to "safeguard" employ-
The plaintiff enters the following proof:
BLACKS WHITES
TYPING(X .1) DICTATION(X .7) TOTAL TYPING(X .1) DIcrATION(X .7) TOTAL
1. 2 .2 5 3.5 3.7 5 .5 2 1.4 1.9
2. 2 .2 5 3.5 3.7 5 .5 2 1.4 1.9
3. 2 .2 5 3.5 3.7 5 .5 2 1.4 1.9
4. 2 .2 5 3.5 3.7 5 .5 2 1.4 1.9
5. 2 .2 5 3.5 3.7 5 .5 2 1.4 1.9
6. 2 .2 4 2.8 3.0 5 .5 2 1.4 1.9
7. 2 .2 3 2.1 2.3 5 .5 2 1.4 1.9
8. 1 .1 3 2.1 2.2 5 .5 1 .7 1.2
9. 1 .1 4 2.8 2.9 4 .4 1 .7 1.1
10. 1 .1 4 2.8 2.9 4 .4 1 .7 1.1
Now, the results dictate hiring seven blacks and no whites. Note that this weighting scheme is more job related
than the employer's scheme because the test weights are directly correlated to results of the job analysis. In
the face of such evidence, the interview would become the focal point of judicial inquiry. The plaintiff's
evidence directly contradicts the employer's proffered justification for the devices and satisfies the burden
of proving a less discriminatory alternative. Thus, an employer's efforts to "insulate" its discriminatory
selection practices with a subjective interview could not obstruct the reach of impact analysis before or after
Watson.
" See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
'o Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787-91.
"' See, B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 91-92. See also, PLAYER, supra note 32, at § 5.41. This
evidentiary burden is usually satisfied with statistical proof showing a device's adverse impact on a protected
group.
82 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2784-85.
Both Justice Blackmun (Id. at 2795) and industrial psychologists challenge the validity of this assumption.
Id. at 2795. See generally, APA Brief, supra note 8.
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ers from any unfair burdens the expanded impact theory could cause in the applied
business setting.84
2. The O'Connor Shuffle
In the face of the traditional impact analysis, Justice O'Connor advocated that
the-plaintiff's prima facie case consists of:85 (a) identification of the alleged
discriminatory selection device, (b) a statistical showing of adverse impact on a
protected group, and (c) proof that the identified device caused the observed
disparity between groups.
The goal of the identification element is to curtail plaintiffs' gun shot pleading
approach. That approach usually resulted in challenges of entire selection systems,
placing a tremendous burden on the employer to defend each selection device.86 Ac-
cordingly, Justice O'Connor's new prima facie case simply attempts to "fairly"
allocate the burdens of discrimination litigation. The approach prevents employers
from shouldering the brunt of the evidentiary and economic burdens of impact cases.
Although Justice O'Connor's criteria deviate somewhat from the traditional
impact analysis, they accomplish an acceptable balance of the competing parties'
interests. If Justice O'Connor had stopped the reconstruction effort at this point, a
unanimous opinion probably would have issued from the Court on the evidentiary
issue. However, Justice O'Connor pressed on and significantly strayed from prior
Supreme Court case law. In doing so, a "second constraint" was erected to protect
employers from the potential explosion of impact claims. 87
3. The Evidentiary Conflict Surfaces
Justice O'Connor attempted to couch this new approach in a discussion of the
employers "business necessity" burden.88 She stated that the Griggs "manifest
relationship" standard could not be interpreted as a shift in the burden of persuasion
84 Justice O'Connor concluded that an employer who must use subjective selection devices (e.g., for
managerial positions) would encounter a "Hobson's choice": (1) use ajob-related subjective device, which
if found to have adverse impact, would be nearly impossible to defend; or (2) simply hire minorities to assure
that no finding of adverse impact could occur (i.e., adopt a quota). After hypothetically posturing the
employer in this precarious position, Justice O'Connor correctly decided that neither outcome was acceptable
under Title VII. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
85 This approach parallels the view of several courts of appeals. See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing,
810 F.2d 1477, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896
(1988).
86 Compare, Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1486 (the plaintififf must prove causation between the practice identified
and the disparate impact) with Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the plaintiff's
challenge of a company's selection system accompanied by a showing of disparate impact would result in
defendant's rebuttal burden of identification of which practice caused the disparity).
87 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 Justice O'Connor stated: "A second constraint on the application of disparate
impact theory lies in the nature of the 'business necessity' or 'job-relatedness' defense."Id.
88 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 22 [1989], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss4/5
from the plaintiff to the defendant. 89 According to Justice O'Connor, the plaintiff in
an impact case does not relinquish the burden of persuasion but carries the "ultimate
burden of proving ...discrimination... caused by a specific employment practice.. .at
all times.' 90 In practice, this statement unifies the evidentiary scheme of both impact
and treatment theories.9' This apparent unification occurs despite the practical and
conceptual differences that prompted the distinctions between the theories.
a) Is Evidentiary Unification Supported by Supreme Court Precedent?
The evidentiary distinctions, which Justice O'Connor's scheme obviates, are
primarily based on the differing situations in which the theories are advanced. 92
Under Griggs and its progeny, the plaintiff had the initial burden of proof (i.e.,
production and persuasion).93 Once that showing was made, the burden of proof, not
production, shifted to the employer to establish the "business necessity" of its
discriminatory device. This burden allocation is consistent with the fact that the
employer, at that point in the litigation, is advancing an affirmative defense, not
merely "a competing theory" for the disparity observed. 94
Analogous to the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)95 defense
under Title VII, the "business necessity" defense is not asserted until the plaintiff
has proved that the selection practice under siege had a discriminatory impact. The
BFOQ defense, although conceptually and practically distinct,96 is comparable to the
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2792-93 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("In attempting to mimic the allocation of burdens the Court has
established in the very different context of individual disparate- treatment claims, the plurality turns a blind
eye to the crucial distinctions between the two forms of claims."). See also, Mertens, Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust (108 S. Ct. 2777): Unanswered Questions, 14 EMPL. REL. L.J. 163-73 (1988) (Addressing the
unification of the two discrimination theories).
92 The impact theory is advanced where a "facially neutral" selection device is alleged to be discriminatory.
Logically, judicial inquiry focuses on the inanimate selection device. In contrast, the treatment theory
contends that an employer's discriminatory attitudes are the basis for plaintiff's treatment. Consequently,
the litigation concentrates on stereotypes and the employer's corresponding behavior.
93 See also, Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (the employer is required to "meet the burden of proving that its tests
are 'job related."'); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (the employer must "[prove that the
challenged requirements are job related.").
9' Justice O'Connor states that impact analysis concerns a series of alternative explanatory theories regarding
the cause of statistical disparities. However, there is a definite difference between a "theory" advanced to
rebut the cause of a statistical disparity and one which, after accepting that disparity, seeks to justify it. This
distinction is the pivotal difference between statistical rebuttal evidence and the business necessity defense.
91 The BFOQ is a statutory exception for selection decisions which are explicitly based on a prohibited factor
(e.g., no females hired as car mechanics). Courts construing this defense have established 3 basic elements
that the defendant must prove. See PLAYER, supra note 32, at § 5.29.
Title VII § 703(e), states, in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (I) it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire...employees...on the basis of [their] religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonable and necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."
I See generally, PLAYER, supra note 32, at § 5.29.
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business necessity defense. In a typical BFOQ case, 97 the plaintiff proves that an
employer policy prohibits hiring based on a prohibited factor (e.g., sex). This is
direct and conclusive proof, in the absence of proof that the prohibited factor is a
BFOQ, that Title VII has been violated. Consequently, the defendant must prove that
the discriminatory factor is a BFOQ or lose the case (i.e., the defendant bears the risk
of non- persuasion). Similarly, under the business necessity defense, once the
employee establishes that a discriminatory selection device is in operation, the
employer must prove that the observed disparate effects are permissible based on the
device's "business necessity." 98 If the employer fails to persuade the trier of fact
on this issue, the case is lost (i.e., the employer bears the risk of non-persuasion).
Thus, it is suggested that a more principled result, under Supreme Court precedent,
is that the defendant assume the burden of persuasion when the plaintiff has
established the operation of a discriminatory selection device.
In addition, under Justice O'Connor's approach, the use of subjective selec-
tion devices would relegate the defendant's rebuttal burden to a de minimis level.
She stated that some characteristics (e.g., loyalty, tact, good judgment) important to
success in certain jobs (e.g., managerial), are not amenable to standardized (i.e., ob-
jective) testing9 9 Based on this assumption, Justice O'Connor states:
"In the context of subjective or discretionary employment decisions, the
employer will often find it easier...to produce evidence of a 'manifest relationship
to the employment in question.""'
Thus, Justice O'Connor presumably lowered the employer's "business necessity"
burden to a level similar to the employer's burden in treatment cases.
0 2
A management selection example illustrates some potential problems under
this approach. Company A has eight vacant business manager positions. The
company hires based on the results of: (1) a mathematics test score, and (2) an
interview, purportedly used to assess ability to engage in social discourse and
leadership. The interviews are unstructured and interviewers are experienced job
9 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Notice that the employer makes no effort to dispel the fact that the policy/device does discriminate. To the
contrary, at this stage the employer tries to prove that the established discriminatory effects are justified
because the selection device furthers a legitimate business purpose (e.g., it selects the person best able to
perform).
99 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
100 Id. at 2791.
10' Justice O'Connor states that upon a prima facie showing of disparate impact, the defendant has the "burden
of producing evidence that its employment practices are based on legitimate business reasons...." Id. at 2790.
Compare that with the employer's burden of production in treatment cases (to "articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" for the decision). See also, id. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring) "Again, the echo
from disparate-treatment cases is unmistakable. In that context, it is enough for an employer 'to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for the allegedly discriminatory act..... Id.
102 Management selection is addressed because Justice O'Connor specifically references managerial posi-
tions as commanding the use of subjective devices. Id. at 2791.
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incumbents. The company has undertaken no effort to establish what KSA's are
necessary forjob performance. The company has never had a black manager and has
no desire to correct that anomaly. Consequently, the interview is routinely used to
conceal the company's discriminatory hiring.
The company receives 100 applications (50 blacks/50 whites). 103 On the basis
of the math test scores, the eight positions should have been filled by the black
candidates. However, the company chooses eight white candidates to fill the vacan-
cies.
i. The Griggs Analysis
Under Griggs and its progeny, proof that the interview has an adverse impact
on blacks satisfies the plaintiff's burden of proof."0 Then, the burden of persuasion
shifts to defendant to prove "business necessity" for the interview. The employer
will fail to meet this burden. The employer has not established the "job-related-
ness" of the interview (i.e., the relationship of characteristics purportedly assessed
in the interview and job performance) nor is there any documentation of interview
results (e.g., notes, ratings of candidates). Under these facts, it is unlikely that the
defendant would establish a "reasonable doubt" in the mind of the trier of fact on
the issue of "business necessity." Consequently, the plaintiff would prevail in the
action.
ii. O'Connor's Impact Analysis
Under Justice O'Connor's approach, the plaintiffs are not so fortunate.
Because of the lesser burden on the employer in the "business necessity" phase, it
is likely that the burden will shift back onto the plaintiff.
As before, the plaintiff has identified the device and showed that it caused the
103 The top 20 scores (1 (low) - 20 (high) on the mathematics test are:
BLACKS WHITES
I1. 19 11. 16 1 . 15 11. 15
2. 13 12. 18 2. 17 12. 16
3. 14 13. 20 3. 16 13. 14
4. 14 14. 16 4. 17 14. 18
5. 20 15. 19 5. 15 15. 18
6. 13 16. 19 6. 17 16. 16
7. 14 17. 15 7. 18 17. 18
8. 18 18. 14 8. 15 18. 16
9. 18 19. 20 9. 17 19. 17
10. 19 20. 19 10. 15 20. 16
104 The selection rate for blacks = 0% (0/50). The selection rate for whites = 16% (8/50). Under the four-
fifths rule, there is adverse impact (zero is less than 80% of 16). In addition, the plaintiff will show that the
math test results dictate the hiring of 8 blacks, but none were hired.
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adverse impact on black candidates. The employer now has the burden of production
to show "...that its employment practices are based on legitimate business rea-
sons ..... ,,05 The employer will assert that the interview was used to assess certain
qualities, necessary for job success, but not amenable to testing. The company will
attempt to establish that each interviewer used his/her qualified judgment (based
upon job experience) to assess those attributes that are necessary to job performance.
In addition, the employer may simply state that the interview was "necessary" to
screen out persons objectively qualified but otherwise unsuitable for the job (i.e.,
they knew math but could not socially interact or lead others). Obviously, this type
of showing, in addition to being a haven for discrimination, places a very minimal
burden on the employer. Even more striking is the fact that the employer is allowed
to avoid "validation" 0 6 of selection devices where adverse impact is established.
This result stands in direct opposition to the Guidelines 17 and the Griggs job relat-
edness concept.
Nevertheless, it will serve to rebut the presumption of discrimination estab-
lished by the plaintiff's evidence. In the absence of strong pretext evidence, given
the burden of persuasion, it is likely that the employer will prevail. This distorted
result is a function of the lesser burden placed on the employer. As such, the modem
scheme could become a vehicle for employers to perpetuate employment discrimi-
nation.
4. The Future of The Modem Scheme
Fortunately, in light of the possible skewed results under Watson, this
proposed scheme is just that - a proposal. Because Watson was a plurality decision,
its effect on the Griggs model is unclear. However, Watson, at a minimum, serves
notice on future Title VII litigants that the evidentiary framework of impact claims
is on shaky ground.
The Court (divided 4 - 3 in favor of adoption) will have two opportunities to
clarify the issue in the 1988-1989 term. Thus, the votes of Justices Kennedy (who
did not participate) and Stevens (who withheld decision on the issue) should become
swing votes. 08
PART II
INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Industrial psychology, in general, is concerned with human behavior in the
o5 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
106 See infra notes 124-125.
"07 See supra note 5.
101 The Court will hear Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1106 (1988) and Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), 827 F.2d
438 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
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work place."0 The practicing industrial psychologist serves a dual role in industry:
(1) to ensure that employees' work environments allow effective and efficient per-
formance, and (2) to provide cost-effective solutions to management concerning
human resource issues. In their struggle to satisfy these competing interests,
industrial psychologists have had to cope with "practical" factors which curtail
their scope of activity. Chief among these "practical" concerns is the onslaught of
federal and state laws governing the employment relationship. 0
Industrial Psychology, Title VII & Personnel Selection
A quick perusal of any industrial psychology text evidences the affiliation of
Title VII and industrial psychology."' Despite the fact that the science of personnel
selection can be traced back to the early 1920's," 2 it was not until the passage of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act' 11 that the two professions began to come together. Since
the early 1970's, a large body of case law" 4 and psychological research 15 has
focused on the inevitable interaction of Title VII, industrial psychology, and
personnel selection.16
Industrial psychological research into selection devices and systems, under
the guidance of the Guidelines 17 and Principles,"l 8 has resulted in a significant body
of research from which legal professionals can gain insight into disputed selection
practices. Recently, industrial psychological research found its way into the
Supreme Court's chambers. In fact, that research was the subject of judicial
"09 For an expanded introduction to industrial psychology, See B. BASS & G. BARRETT, PEOPLE, WORK, &
ORGANIZATIONS 3-21 (2nd ed. 1981).
"
0 See supra note 1. Although industrial psychologists must find methods of achieving maximum employee
satisfaction and productivity within the confines of employment law, this comment focuses on the interac-
tion of Title VII, employment selection, and industrial psychology. See, e.g., Cascio, Alexander, & Barrett,
Setting Cutoff Scores: Legal, Psychometric, and Professional Issues & Guidelines, 41, PERSONNEL
PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1988); Cooper& Barrett, Equal Pay and Gender: Implications ofCourt Casesfor Personnel
Practices, 9 ACAD. MGrr. REV. 84 (1984).
See W. CAscIo, APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 19-21 (3rd ed. 1987).
See R. GUION, Recruiting, Selection and Job Placement, HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY 777 (M. Dunnette ed. 1976).
II3 See supra note 2.
H4 See supra notes 20 - 42.
"1 See, e.g., Leap, Holley, & Field, Equal Employment Opportunity and Its Implications for Personnel
Practices, 27 LAB. L.J. 278 (1976); DOVERSPIKE, supra note 77 (An attempt to clarify misconceptions
concerning feasibility and viability of traditional selection procedures and introduction of various selection
procedures).
"6 A sub-field of industrial psychology, personnel psychology, is directly concerned with all aspects of
individual differences in the workplace. For instance, personnel psychologists determine what KSA's are
necessary for job performance (i.e., job analysis), how to evaluate employee performance (i.e., performance
appraisal), and how to assess potential employees (i.e., selection system design). While this comment
discusses the concepts traditionally associated with personnel psychology, the author uses the broader term
for purposes of introduction to the legal profession. For a greater explanation of personnel psychology, See
B.BASS & G.BARRETT, supra note 109, at 229-58.
M 7 See supra note 5.
"18 See supra note 31.
Spring, 1989] COMMENTS
17
Bell: Watson and Subjective Hiring Practices
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
recognition in the Watson case."19 Watson is the most recent example of the
relationship between Title VII and industrial psychology which dates back to
Griggs. 120
The Current State of Industrial Psychological Knowledge on
"Subjective" Selection Devices'2'
1. Background
A core concept winding through Title VII and industrial psychology is
validation. 122 Since Griggs, industrial psychologists have played a vital role in
establishing the "job relatedness" of selection devices.'23 Job-relatedness, in Title
VII parlance, has become virtually synonymous with the validation of a selection
device. Consequently, industrial psychologists are consistently called on to demon-
strate, and substantiate, the relationship between: (1) the selection device, (2) the
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA's) necessary to perform the job, and (3) job
performance. 124 This is, in fact, the validation process.
25
'19 See, APA Brief, supra note 8; Doverspike, supra note 77.
121 Justice Blackmun cited directly to the APA Brief in his concurring opinion (Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2795 n.5)
to support the assertion that subjective selection devices, like objective ones, are also capable of "psychom-
etric scrutiny" (i.e., validation).
12 1 This section of the comment introduces research cited in the APA Brief, supra note 8; the author's purpose
is to introduce these psychological concepts to legal professionals, particularly employment lawyers, in a
manner which allows effective insight into issues affecting corporate and individual clients.
122 See supra note 31, 124-125.
23 The broader concept is "business necessity." The job-relatedness (i.e., validity) of a selection device is
probative of the employer's business purpose for use of the device. The Griggs Court established that if a
test had an adverse impact on a protected group and was not "job related," the test was being "used to
discriminate" and fell outside the Title VII testing exemption (§ 703(h), supra note (4)). The Griggs Court
stated: "Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obviously they are useful.
What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance...What Congress has commanded is that any tests
used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract."
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added).
124 Both the Guidelines, supra note 5, and the Principles, supra note 31, regulate the validation process and
set out rules for establishing the reliability and validity of selection devices.
I" There are three validation strategies under both the Guidelines and the Principles: (1) content, (2) criterion,
and (3) construct validity. Content validity is"an attempt to establish that test performance is a representative
sample of job performance or job-required knowledge. " See Principles, supra note 31, at 37. Criterion
validity is "an attempt to demonstrate a statistical relationship between scores on a predictor (e.g., selection
device] and scores on a criterion [e.g., job performance] measure." Id. Construct validity is "an attempt
to demonstrate a relationship between underlying traits or hypothetical constructs [e.g., leadership] and job
related behavior." Id. See also, Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 1607.14 (B), (C), (D). Each type of validation
is dependent on defining what KSA's are essential for a given job. Ajob analysis is "a procedure undertaken
to understand job duties and behaviors and performance standards." See Principles, supra note 31, at 38.
A job analysis provides information necessary to develop or select a selection device which measures a job's
KSA's.
For example, Company A, (see supra note 78), is developing a selection system for their business manager
position. In order to choose a selection device which is "demonstrably related to job performance," the
employer must identify what KSA's are necessary for job performance. Consequently, the employer hires
an industrial psychologist to perform a job analysis of the manager position.
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2. Subjective Devices
Personal interviews and employee performance ratings are among the most
commonly encountered "subjective" selection devices. 1 26 The Watson Court, on
the surface, adopted different, albeit polarized, positions on the issue of whether
these subjective selection devices could be validated similar to objective devices. 127
Industrial psychologists, as delineated in the APA Brief, believe the answer is yes. 128
a) The Employment Interview
The personal interview, given its cost-effectiveness and convenience, is
probably the most often used selection device.1 29 In spite of its frequent use, the
interview, in an uncontrolled setting, is plagued with problems.
The most common problem, which compromises the validity of the interview,
is the attitudinal bias of the interviewer. 130 For example, the interviewer can be
unduly influenced by a single factor (e.g., physical attractiveness) which impacts on
the assessment of job-related factors (e.g., communication skills). 131 Interviewer
stereotypes also bias the interview results.3 2 Despite these problems, industrial psy-
chologists believe that interviews can be accurate predictors of job performance if
The job analysis identifies that the position requires a knowledge of algebra. Under a content validation
strategy, an algebra test is constructed which samples the knowledge needed for the job by asking questions
which are similar to those encountered on the job. A criterion validation approach would assess the
relationship between the scores of the algebra test and a measure of job performance. The criterion validity
study results in a figure which represents the strength of the relationship between test performance and job
performance (i.e., a validity correlation coefficient).
126 Both the Guidelines, supra note 5, and the Principles, supra note 24, regulate the validation process and
set out rules for establishing the reliability and validity of selection devices.
127 Compare, Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787 (Justice O'Connor noted "that' ... 'validating' subjective criteria...
[in a manner similar to objective criteria] is impracticable.") with, Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2795 (Justice
Blockman stated "a variety of methods are available in establishing the link between these [i.e., subjective]
selection processes and job performance, just as they are in objective devices.").
For example (see supra note 78), if Company A's job analysis finds that oral communication skills
are necessary to mangement performance, a content valid interview could be developed. The interview
would ask specific questions which elicit oral communication and assess the interviewee on his/her ability
to communicate. This intuitive "face-valid" approach is consistent with both Justice O'Connor's
perspective that the interview is "manifestly" related to the job and Justice Blackmun's ideas concerning
an establishing link between the selection device, the requisite KSA's and job performance.
28 See APA Brief, supra note 8, at 1020 - 27. The APA's amicus brief presents industrial psychological
research on interviews, performance ratings and experience requirements.
129 See e.g., W. CAScIO, supra note Il l, at 263-64.
'
30 The effect of interviewer bias is distortion of the interviewer's final judgment. Thus, the link between the
interview (i.e., information elicited concerning relevant KSA's) and job performance is diluted. This occurs
because the interviewer attends to factors which are not related to job performance. This "bias," in effect,
reduces the accuracy of the inferences based on the interview results because the final judgment is based on
attributes unrelated to job performance. See Schmitt, Social and Situational Determinants of Interview
Decisions: Implications for the Employment Interview, 29 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY, 79, 97 (1976).
13, For instance, the interviewer concludes that a beautiful interviewee is also intelligent and articulate.
32 Stereotyping occurs when the interviewee is attributed certain characteristics based on their membership
in a certain group (e.g., race, sex) instead of their idiosyncratic characteristics.
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AKRON LAW REVIEW
they are developed according to generally accepted psychometric standards.'33
Asking questions that are directly linked to job analysis results and informa-
tion from job incumbents increases the structure and job- relatedness of the interview
(which reduces bias, thus increasing validity of interviewer judgments). A good
example of this approach, developed by industrial psychologists, is the situational
interview. 134
The situational interview calls for the transformation of information gathered
on critical incidents 3 5 into interview questions. 36 The interviewer asks a hypotheti-
cal question based on the critical incidents.'37 The applicant is directed to explain
what he/she would do if faced with the facts presented. Each answer is rated inde-
pendently on a five-point scale.'38 The scores received on these interviews are then
scrutinized to assess their relationship to job performance.139
In addition, and this is commonly ignored by employers for cost reasons, the
validity of the interviewer should be established. Conceptually, the interview is an
information gathering device necessary to accurate decision-making. Thus, the
interviewer needs "skills in data gathering and [data] interpreting.' '1 40  As no
effective decision can be made with inaccurate or irrelevant information, or worse,
no information, interviewers should be trained on interviewing techniques. Training
should focus on improving the interviewer's ability to focus on and retain job-related
information. In addition, the employer should develop a more structured interview
to establish some sort of relativity between interviewers and interviewees. 141 A
structured interview increases the ability of interviewers to focus on job-related
information, and decreases assessment of irrelevant attributes which distract inter-
"3 See APA Brief, supra note 8, at 1023.
'
34 Latham, Saari, Pursell & Campion, The Situational Interview, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 422 (1980) (here-
inafter Interview). See also, Latham & Saari, Do People Do What They Say? Further Studies on the
Situational Interview, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 569 (1984).
' A critical incident is a report "by knowledgeable observers of things employees did that were especially
effective or ineffective in accomplishing parts of their jobs." See W. CASCIO, supra note 111, at 88.
136 See APA Brief, supra note 8, at 1023 n.24.
"' For example, for a management position: "How would you delegate duties to senior level subordinates
that are commonly perceived as low level tasks?"
118 Two separate persons rate the answers on a five point scale. This serves to increase reliability of results
because of a broader sample of behavior.
13 The scores of each interviewee were correlated with ajob performance criterion. This is a typical criterion
validity study which seeks to establish a statistical relationship between the predictor score (e.g., interview
results) and a criterion measure (e.g., job performance).
Most importantly, the process was found to accurately predict future job performance of females and blacks.
See Interview, supra note 134.
"4 See A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 610-61 (5th ed. 1982).
141 If two persons interview the same person but focus on different attributes, the interviews cannot be
compared to assess the ratings on certain factors. The ability to compare ratings on the same factors is a great
advantage to ensure accuracy and decrease the operation of interviewer bias in the ratings. The objective is
to accumulate as much information as possible, from all qualified sources, to get a more reliable picture of
the interviewee's attributes. A standardized interview also reduces the importance of each interviewer's
individual judgments and corresponding biases.
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viewer attention and distort perceptions.
In sum, the use of employment interviews should be "preceded by a
thorough analysis of the target job, the development of a structured set
of questions based on the job analysis, and the development of behav-
iorally specific rating instruments by which to evaluate applicants."
The assessment of employees " should be maximally dependent on their
personal characteristics and minimally dependent on who made the
assessment...Where non-test predictors like interviewer judgments are
used, the [employer] should develop procedures that will minimize
error resulting from differences between judges." 142
b) Performance Ratings
As opposed to the interview, a performance rating covers a longer period of
behavior (bi-annual and annual ratings are common) on which to base an employ-
ment decision. Despite this fact, ratings, and performance appraisals in general, are
consistently attacked for their subjectivity and bias.
i. Introduction
Employee performance appraisal provides feedback to employees concerning
their work and provides employers with information necessary to human resource
planning. Performance ratings are conducted for various reasons and by various
methods. 43 Among the most popular rating scales are the behaviorally anchored
rating scale (BARS)'" and the graphic rating scale. BARS use dimensions derived
from worker and supervisor ratings of the important dimensions of effective job
performance. 14 Job behavior statements "anchor" each dimension. These state-
ments are positioned vertically on a scale. The statements form a continuum running
form those which exemplify effective performance to those which illustrate poor
performance. 146
The greatest virtue of BARS are the behavioral anchors. The anchors establish
the scales job relatedness because the rating is based on incumbent's job behaviors.
This is legally relevant because a rating used to select for promotions is subject to
the same job relatedness restrictions as any other "test.' 147
142 See APA Brief, supra note 8, at 1023-24 (citations omitted).
143 See generally, W. CASCIO, supra note 111.
'4 For greater explanation of the BARS system, See W. CASCIO, supra note 111, at 92-95.
141 Id. at 93.
"'For example, a telephone operator position is rated on "accuracy." The dimension has statements ranging
from "takes too much time to give requested information" (ineffective) to "time from receipt of request to
information disbursement is consistently small" (effective).
141 A performance appraisal is considered a selection procedure under the Guidelines. See generally,
Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 2(C).
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The graphic rating scale is the most common, albeit simplest, rating method. 148
This type of scale vertically presents an array of employee attributes. An employee
receives a rating on each attribute. Graphic rating scales traditionally have from five
to nine points. The rater's task is to select a rating which represents the employee's
"score" on a particular attribute.
Regardless of the method used, each has inherent weaknesses and are
frequently attacked in employment litigation as discriminatory.
ii. Bias in Ratings
In order to create rating instruments that can withstand psychometric and legal
scrutiny, industrial psychologists have accumulated a large body of performance
rating research.'49 Rating scales, like interviews, are subject to rater bias. 150 In
employment situations, a bias can arise where the rater and ratee are of different
races. It is not unheard of for white raters to assign significantly lower ratings to
black ratees than white ratees.'"' Unfortunately, the magnitude of this race conscious
effect is reported to be greater in real life than in laboratory studies. 52 In addition,
the probability of this type of rater distortion occurring increases as the proportion
of blacks in the workforce decreases.1
53
iii. Constructing a Valid Rating System
Although these conclusions do not aid employers in discrimination litigation,
there are several steps to take in developing a defensible rating system. A job
"I For greater explanation of graphic rating scales, See, W. CASCIO, supra note 111, at 88-9 1.
"'See e.g., Landy & Barr, Performance Rating, 87 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 72 (1980); Cascio & Bernardin,
Implications of Peformance Appraisal Litigation for Personnel Decisions, 34 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 211
(1981).
"'
5 See APA Brief, supra note 8, at 1024. These biases decrease the reliability of the ratings: In the "perfectly"
reliable rating, the rater would focus solely on job related factors and observe all relevant work behavior. To
the extent that the rater does neither, the reliability of the rating, relative to actual employee performance,
gets farther away from the "ideal" rating.
An example of these biases are: (1) opportunity bias - a rater has not seen all behavior necessary to rate the
employee on the scale but has the necessary information to rate a fellow employee; (2) halo effect - the rater's
favorable/unfavorable judgment on one factor influences the ratings of other factors; (3) error of central
tendency - the rater uses the middle of the rating scale and avoids the extreme ratings; and (4) leniency error
- the rater, for many reasons, is reluctant to assign poor ratings. Id.
"51 See Kraiger & Ford, A Meta-analysis of Ratee Race Effects on Performance Ratings, 70 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY 56 (1985) (hereinafter Kraiger). These findings do not support the conclusion that performance
ratings are discriminatory per se. Some studies have found no race effect on ratings (i.e., ratings of racially
opposite interviewers did not significantly impact ratings). See Schmidt & Johnson, Effect of Race on Peer
Ratings in an Industrial Setting, 57 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 237 (1973). Those results occurred where the
raters had training in rating skills and the workforce was highly integrated. See, Schmidt & Johnson, Effect
of Race on Peer Ratings in an Industrial Setting, 57 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 237 (1973).
152 See Kraiger, supra note 51.
'13 Id. Suggesting, as intuition would dictate, that less integrated work forces have the greatest potential for
perpetuation of discrimination and stifled minority progression.
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analysis is the centerpiece of establishing the job relatedness of the rating device. In
order to attain legal strength, the knowledge, skills, and abilities rated must be
identified through ajob analysis. In the absence of such an effort, the employer could
rate attributes that have little or no relation to effective performance. 54 More impor-
tantly, if the performance rating is used for promotions to other positions, the
employer must establish its job relatedness for the future position.'55 Consequently,
a relationship must be established between the current and future positions to ensure
that the attributes rated for the current position are also related to job performance
in the new position. If the current and future positions do not require the use of
similar knowledge, skills, and abilities, the ratings will become a weakness in the
employer's defense should it be scrutinized in litigation. Courts usually require ajob
analysis to verify the overlap of factors in the current and future position. 156 As such,
the touchstone of any defensible rating system is the job analysis. Without it, an
employer's ratings are questionable on their face and subject to impeachment in
court.
Like interviews, the skill of the rater is a critical factor in reliability of rating
scales. The most qualified rater is that person who is familiar with the work to be
performed, and has the skills to accurately perceive and rate that work behavior. 157
The finding that raters in close proximity (e.g., first level supervisors) to the ratee
provide more reliable ratings'58 supports this position. More importantly, especially
for training and development purposes, persons trained in rating skills showed a
decrease in rating errors. 9 This decrease resulted in an increase in the reliability and
validity of ratings. 160
To summarize, a rating system can withstand legal scrutiny if:161 (1) the
attributes rated are directly correlated (i.e., job related) with the results of a reliable
job analysis; (2) the attributes rated are clear, definite factors (e.g., accuracy), not
abstract, global traits (e.g., honesty); (3) the ratings are behaviorally based, allowing
154 This frequently occurs where a job's duties change over time based on technology or organizational
development. The KSA's rated were critical to the prior job, but have little importance for the new job. In
the absence of a current job analysis, an employer may rate the old position's relevant KSA's which are less
job related for the new position.
"I The instrument's job relatedness has not been established and, in the face of adverse impact, would be a
Title VII violation.
'56 See Cascio & Bemardin, Implications of Peformance Appraisal Litigation for Personnel Decisions, 34
PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 211, 217 (1981). See also, Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 431-33. The Court condemned
the employer's validation study as "materially defective" because the rating system did not comply with the
job analysis requirements in the Guidelines.
"I See Kleiman & Durham, Performance Appraisal, Promotion and the Courts: A Critical Review, 34
PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 103, 114 (1981).
158 See L. CRONBACH, supra note 21, at 512.
'
59 See A. ANASTASI, supra note 140, at 612. The methods and utility of rater training for reduction in rating
errors and bias are explicated in, See e.g., Bemardin & Pence, Effects Of Rater Training, 65 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY 60 (1980); Borman, Format and Training Effects on Rating Accuracy and Rating Errors, 64 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 410 (1979).
16 Id.W6 See, APA Brief, supra note 8, at 1025.
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for comparison (i.e., verification) of ratings with evidence of ratee's job behavior;
and (4) the raters are trained to reduce sources of bias and errors.
CONCLUSION
Watson's legal impact remains unclear pending further clarification. How-
ever, the decision's impact on employment practices will be immediate. Employers
can no longer harbor discriminatory attitudes under the guise of subjective selection
practices. In Watson, the Court purged selection practices of subjectivity in an effort
to curb discrimination and create equal employment opportunity for all people.
Watson serves notice to employers that subjective selection practices are to be
strictly scrutinized in misuse.
Industrial psychologists can of assist employers in the development and
defense of subjective selection practices. Under Watson, cautious employers are
advised to establish the job relatedness of all selection devices. Although this can
be an expensive proposition, employers have several strategies available to them
which have differing costs. 162 In the face of climbing litigation expense, the costs
saved on potential litigation makes validation a cost-effective approach to human
resource management. In this role, industrial psychologists will become a strong
force in human resource management in the 1990's.
DANIEL L. BELL
162 See DOVERSPIKE, supra note 77, at 42-43. For more material on Watson readers are referred to: Mertens,
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust [108 S.Ct. 2777); Unanswered Questions, 14 EMPL. REL. L.J. 163-73
(1988); Note, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust: 108 S.Ct. 2777, 102 HARV. L. REV. 308-20 (1988).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 22 [1989], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss4/5
